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Communicating risk to the public looms as a confusing, perhaps even wildly unpredictable, process to many scientists and policymakers. 
People confronted with risky situations often seem to respond irrationally. 
Their reactions sometimes suggest that they are evaluating information in 
superficial and hasty ways. It is hard to see patterns in the judgments they 
make about whose information is credible and whose is not. Incredibly 
enough, they even seem to believe what they read in newspaper stories.
Others (see Hoban and Kendall, page 73) focused on how we, as indi-
viduals, perceive risks “out there.” This presentation will focus on some 
work by communication scholars that explores how we all use information 
to make judgments about risk. More specifically, I want to talk about how, 
given a risky situation, individuals choose information channels in order to 
learn about the risk, as well as to decide how worried to be about that risk.
Why care about information channels? Let me respond in two ways. 
One is that the old-fashioned view of the risk communication process—a 
simple stimulus-response scenario in which the expert spouts information
and the recipient ingests and then acts in ways consonant with that informa-
tion—rarely seems to work, and ignoring channel preferences may be one of 
the many reasons why. A second reason for caring 
about channels is that the findings of communication 
research suggests their role is counter-intuitive. Put 
another way, we all seem to routinely misjudge the ef-
fects of channel use on people’s risk judgments. If part 
of the goal of this report is to engage the agricultural 
biotechnology community in fruitful public discussion 
of risk, then reconfiguring our understanding of channel use is important.
FIRST, AN EXAMPLE....
Before discussing some of the things we have been learning about how folks 
use information channels to inform their risk judgments, let me begin with 
an example. A very personal one, I might add.
Some years ago, Steve, my partner, and I sat down to watch a NOVA pro-
gram about asbestos. Midway through, Steve wondered aloud if the stuff 
wrapped around the steam pipes in the basement of our old refurbished 
farmhouse might not be moldering asbestos. It was. We now had to decide 
what to do about it.
We began an intensive search for information. We called state agencies, 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and various information offices 
at our university. We rummaged through libraries. We ended up with a large 
pile of information about asbestos but, we felt, no information specific 
enough for our needs. So we next embarked on a search for individuals who 
could investigate our problem in person. Two engineers ultimately found 
their way into our basement. One resurfaced with the soothing message that 
we would be quite safe if we left the asbestos as is; the other hastened back up 
the basement stairs and warned us to stay out of the basement until the asbes-
tos had been removed.
In desperation, we finally asked ourselves: Would we ever return to 
the basement if we left the asbestos in place? The answer was no. A few 
weeks later we hired the best professional we could find to remove the stuff.
Although I did not realize it at the time, this saga nicely illustrates some 
of the more important channel factors that scholars have discovered in recent 
years. Three will be discussed here: 1. the notion of channel utility; 2. the ar-
gument that individuals use different channels to inform different dimen-
sions of risk judgment; and 3. the argument that individuals evaluate infor-
mation in some channels as more relevant to themselves than information in 
other channels. Be aware that I make a distinction between “channel” and 
“source.” A channel is a mode of transmission—The New York Times, 60 Min-
utes, an interpersonal interaction. Sources, on the other hand, are informa-
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tion providers embedded in channels. A single channel can offer many 
sources, or just one.
CHANNEL UTILITY
Our world is awash in information channels. The mass media are obvious 
ones, and they often get fingered as the sole, or at least the primary, channels 
used by the public to learn about risks. But recall how you came to terms 
with a recent salient risk and you will realize that, in an information-rich so-
ciety such as this one, we have many channels at our disposal. In the asbestos 
example above, Steve and I utilized television, newspapers, various printed 
brochures and pamphlets, and human beings.
But we typically do not access these channels in equal dollops. Stanford 
researcher Steve Chaffee (1986) argues that our use of any particular channel 
depends on two things: the cost of getting to that channel and a judgment 
of the likely relevance of information that we may find there. The joint out-
come of those two factors determines something called “channel utility.”
Some channels are too costly to use, even when we judge the informa-
tion they contain to be of high quality. For example, many people will cite a 
physician as their preferred channel for information about health risks such 
as AIDS (Freimuth et al., 1987), but few individuals will actually discuss 
those risks with physicians. The physician ranks high in terms of likely in-
formation relevance, but she is also costly to access; most individuals in our 
culture either cannot afford to visit a doctor just to talk about health issues 
or are reluctant to ask time of such a high-status person.
Conversely, other channels may be easy to access but may be judged inap-
propriate for certain types of information. For example, some of the most ac-
cessible publications in the country are sitting in 
supermarket checkout lanes. Yet, many individuals 
would regard The National Enquirer as a poor 
source of information about biotechnology risks.
For most of us, juggling cost and relevance 
leads to channel tradeoffs. In fact, more often
than not, we may settle for a particular channel not because we prefer it, but 
because it is available. Many of our preferred channels may be too costly to 
access and we, thus, “make do” with a variety of channels—such as the mass 
media—whose information we may regard as reasonable but not necessarily 
on-point. For example, although we may prefer to learn about AIDS from 
our physicians, we do not. Instead, we rely heavily on the mass media for 
such health information. That reliance stems not from a judgment that 
newspapers are better sources of health information than physicians—to the 
contrary, when asked, individuals are quick to note otherwise (Reagan and
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Collins, 1987)—but from the fact that newspapers are far easier to access and 
are regarded as being generally informative.
RISK JUDGMENT AND CHANNEL CHOICES
The days when scientists went looking for a tight fit between level of risk and 
behavioral response are long gone. Risk perception researchers have made it 
abundantly clear over the years that we all use multiple factors to evaluate a 
risk and that estimates of likelihood of coming to harm—while taken into ac-
count when available—are only part of the picture and must compete with 
other factors, such as our familiarity with the risk, our sense of control over it, 
and its catastrophic potential (Slovic, 1987).
If one acknowledges that decisions about risky situations are grounded in 
multiple dimensions rather than just one, then it is a short conceptual hop to 
the idea that individuals may prefer different channels to inform different di-
mensions of risk judgment.
And that is just what risk communication researchers are finding. Re-
cent work suggests that individuals differentiate between channels that are 
appropriate for learning about a risk and those best used to decide how wor-
ried to be about the risk. Specifically, individuals seem willing to rely on the 
mass media and other “impersonal” channels in order to gather information 
about a particular risk. But they seem unwilling to rely on those same chan-
nels to reach decisions about how worried to 
be. Instead, they prefer interpersonal chan-
nels to inform this “worry dimension.”
For example, in a study of young adults’ 
perceptions of the risk of contracting the 
HIV virus, Dunwoody and Neuwirth (1991) 
found that use of the mass media predicted 
to participants’ understanding of level of risk 
(a cognitive, knowledge variable) but not to 
their level of worry about contracting the vi-
rus (an affective variable). Rather, the best 
channel predictor of level of worry was interpersonal.
While this flies in the face of a pervasive cultural assumption that the 
mass media can scare us to death by “sensationalizing” information, it is 
quite consistent with a growing body of mass communication research that 
finds media messages far more closely linked to cognitions than to affect. 
That is, the media seem to operate principally as sources of information in 
our world, not as persuasive forces.
That distinction played itself out in the little asbestos saga above. Steve 
and I gathered lots of mass-produced information and learned a great deal 
about asbestos. But we were reluctant to use that information to construct a
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sense of how worried we should be about the stuff in our basement. Instead, 
we wanted to talk to human beings. We sought out interpersonal channels to 
help us with that dimension of risk judgment.
REFERENTIAL LEVEL AND CHANNEL CHOICES
Risk perception researchers have demonstrated that, when confronted with a 
hazard, we systematically differentiate between the level of risk it poses to 
others and to ourselves. Specifically, we underestimate our personal level of 
risk compared to that of others (Weinstein, 1989).
Again, it is a short conceptual hop to the idea that, if individuals distin-
guish between self and others when judging level of risk, they may utilize dif-
ferent information channels to inform those two different judgments.
And again, mass communication research bears this. Specifically, indi-
viduals seem to interpret mass media information as telling them about the 
risks to people “out there” but resist seeing those same messages as telling 
them anything about their personal level of risk. Instead, once again inter-
personal channels are the preferred source of personal risk information.
Two studies offer good illustrations of this phenomenon. Tyler and Cook 
(1984), in a series of experiments examining the ways in which information 
influenced individuals’ judgments of the risk of being victimized, found that: 
1. personal- and societal-level judgments were quite independent of one 
another; and 2. mass media crime stories influenced 
those societal-level judgments but not the personal 
ones. In other words, reading newspaper stories about 
crime leads you to think that folks around you (i.e., 
in your community, your state, your country) have a 
greater likelihood of being victimized, but the stories 
will not influence your assessment of your own per-
sonal level of risk. The world around you may look 
scarier, but you see your neighborhood as immune to 
that trend.
Similarly, Culbertson and Stempel (1985), in a survey of Ohio residents, 
found the self-other distinction: Seventy-five percent of the respondents 
criticized the availability of health care in the United States while only 5 per-
cent viewed their own health care environment negatively. Further, evalua-
tions of media coverage of health were correlated more with respondents’ as-
sessments of the quality of health care available to Americans than with their 
assessments of their personal care.
In sum, mass-mediated information influences our social-level percep-
tions but not our individual-level ones. This differential impact has come to 
be known as the “impersonal impact hypothesis,” as it suggests that, in the 
words of Tyler and Cook (1984), “the modality of indirect experience, which
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is most effectively controlled by society and which reaches the largest audi-
ences—the mass media—is the least effective in influencing personal con-
cerns” (p. 694).
This referential distinction emerged starkly during the asbestos saga. 
While Steve and I gathered reams of written information about asbestos, we 
resisted seeing the information as telling us something about our personal 
level of risk. We clung to the assumption that our situation was somehow 
unique. The more general written documents could not be sensitive, we felt, 
to the amount, age and condition of the asbestos in our basement. We finally 
resorted to bringing in human beings to stare at our asbestos and offer rec-
ommendations for dealing with it.
Again, the argument that mass media channels are ineffective at the per-
sonal level flies in the face of many individuals’ 
assumptions about our use of information 
channels. We all believe we have witnessed the 
impact of the media on personal perceptions, be 
it the specter of thousands of residents who fled 
their homes in 1979 in reaction to the news that 
the damaged Three Mile Island reactor might 
harbor a potentially catastrophic hydrogen 
bubble or the hundreds of phone calls to cancer 
or AIDS hotlines after the inevitable public disclosure of a well-known per-
sonality with the disease.
Indeed, a good bit of empirical evidence suggests that the mass media do 
serve an alerting function, that individuals use newspapers, radio and TV as 
social antennae to alert them to situations or issues “out there” that may need 
attention. But once the issue has become salient to an individual, that 
“agenda-setting” function is only the beginning of an elaborate process of in-
formation-gathering, one in which the mass media are only part of a panoply 
of channels, each being used for very specific but very different purposes.
By way of example, I turn again to the asbestos saga. It was television— 
specifically a NOVA program—that alerted Steve and I to the problem of as-
bestos. But when we began looking in earnest for detailed information about 
the risk, we gave little thought to seeking information in media channels. Me-
dia stories are time-based, intermittent, ephemeral. They lack detail. Their 
presence coincides with news “out there,” not with the personal situations of 
their readers. So for us, the mass media served its classic alerting function and 
then vanished as a relevant channel during the rest of our search.
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THE LIMITS OF MASS MEDIA CHANNELS
This inability of media channels to inform individuals’ personal levels of risk 
is disconcerting to some policymakers for another reason: They engage in
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multimillion-dollar information campaigns to convince us to change a num-
ber of life-threatening habits, from smoking to having unprotected sex, and 
those campaigns traditionally rely heavily on the mass media to carry their 
messages. Our resistance to seeing mediated messages as relevant to our-
selves is costly to campaign designers—so costly that it has sparked a good 
deal of discussion about why the public makes this channel distinction and 
what can be done about it. Researchers have proffered a few educated 
guesses.
One argument is that our insistence on interpreting mediated channels 
as informing only our understanding of society is a learned response applied 
to all media messages. That is, we have all have grown up amidst the mass 
media and, over time, have learned that media stories are always about folks 
“out there,” never about us. We have learned, in other words, to interpret 
media messages as telling us about others, about society.
If this argument is correct, then one may be able to counteract that pattern 
either by recasting media messages in ways that signal to the reader that 
“this story is about you” or by training audience members to interpret existing 
messages differently. In the former camp, strategies might include begin-
ning stories with story narratives featuring individuals like the typical reader, 
or using the second-person “you” throughout the story. A focus on the latter 
strategy must begin with a better understand-
ing of how people interpret mediated messages 
and then would require a kind of resocialization 
process. Efforts to change audience perceptions 
through restructuring media accounts have not 
been fruitful to date (see Dunwoody etal., 1992).
Although scholars have not yet explored the no-
tion of “retraining” media message users, researchers have demonstrated the 
value of educational efforts in such areas as promoting better individual use 
of mathematical and statistical concepts (see Nisbett et al., 1983).
Another argument is that individuals do indeed use media channels to 
inform personal risk levels but that, since most of the risks reflected in me-
dia accounts are those whose likelihood of occurrence is low, no change in 
personal risk levels is necessary. Tyler and Cook (1984) maintain that, un-
der such conditions, “the rational and discerning response of most mem-
bers of the public probably should be to refrain from changing their estima-
tion of their own risk while acknowledging that the problem may be greater 
to society in general than they had thought” (p. 206). This hypothesis has not 
been tested, but the self-other distinction seems to hold across a range of 
risks and likelihood levels.
Finally, yet a third group argues that we are so resistant to seeing our-
selves as being at risk that nothing can dissuade us from interpreting our
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level of risk as lower than that of the folks around us. If true, no amount of 
fiddling with media stories about hazards will convince audiences that those 
stories have something to say about their personal likelihood of coming to 
harm. Partial support for this position comes from Gunther and Mundy 
(1993), who found in one study that media stories recounting disadvanta-
geous consequences generated the self-other referential distinction while 
stories that posed potential benefits did not. Respondents immediately in-
terpreted the positive stories as relevant to themselves, in other words, but 
resisted seeing the negative stories in the same way. This suggests that at 
least part of the problem lies with our reactions to the message rather than to 
the channel.
DISCUSSION
Learning how people use information to inform their risk judgments is diffi-
cult. A literal blizzard of factors about the individuals themselves can in-
fluence those judgments, everything from a person’s available store of 
knowledge about the risk to personality factors that make some people 
more likely to take risks than others. Attributes of the messages them-
selves introduce another welter of factors, from 
the clarity of the words and phrases to the vivid-
ness of the text.
In this brief presentation I have tried to illu-
minate one element within that panoply of message 
factors: the influence of channel. The bottom line 
here is that channel makes a difference. Given chan-
nel choice, individuals will use different channels 
to help them make decisions about different dimensions of a risk. For ex-
ample, a magazine article about radon may contribute to their understand-
ing of the damage that radon can do to the human body. But when it comes 
to deciding whether or not to install a radon detector—that is, whether indi-
viduals should be worried enough about the risk to engage in some level of 
expense to determine the level of hazard to themselves—they will opt for a 
channel that they feel can take their personal situation into account. Almost 
without exception, that channel is interpersonal.
What does this mean for risk communicators? First, I think it requires 
us to be clear about our communications goals and to select channels that fit 
with those goals. You may employ very different channels to explain a risk— 
actual or potential-—than you will use to try to persuade audiences that the 
risk should or should not worry them.
Second, it forces us to ponder the inequitable nature of channel access.
In an ideal world, individuals could select among a myriad of channels to
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meet their informational and decision needs. They could locate both popu-
lar and technical documents in publications or in electronic databases; they 
could talk to experts.
But only a very few, socially advantaged souls have such extensive chan-
nel access. Many Americans live their lives in something of an informational 
straightjacket; economics and the social context within which they live have 
severely restricted their channel choices. They do not subscribe to a newspa-
per. They may buy only the occasional magazine off the newsstand. They 
have little experience with libraries, even less with searching for information 
by computer. They have no idea how to get to human experts. They have 
never made a phone call to a governmental agency in search of an answer to a 
question.
For these individuals, the cost of using even generally available channels 
to inform their risk judgments may be high indeed, so high that it serves as 
an effective barrier to informed decision-making.
Finally, research on channel use raises the specter of an active audience. 
Turn-of-the-century communication researchers viewed the audience as a 
passive mass that absorbed and reacted to messages in predictable ways. 
Studies since World War II have turned that image around, suggesting in-
stead that information users play an important role in selecting and process-
ing messages. That filtering process can make or break a communication at-
tempt, and it means that risk communication managers must be sensitive to 
the information recipient as a major player in the communication process.
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